Evaluación psicométrica de una escala de creencias conspirativas para población peruana
Resumen
El pensamiento conspirativo es la tendencia a atribuir las causas de problemas importantes a complots secretos organizados por personas que buscan causar daño a la sociedad. Si bien este pensamiento tiene consecuencias importantes, no se encuentran instrumentos validados que permitan medirlo en español. El presente estudio busca cerrar esta brecha al traducir y adaptar la General Conspiracist Beliefs Scale (GCBS) al español y analizar sus evidencias de validez y confiabilidad. Para ello, se reclutó a 316 participantes en las redes sociales y se analizó la adecuación psicométrica de la prueba. Para las evidencias de validez provenientes de la estructura factorial de la prueba, se confirmó una estructura de tres factores: conspiraciones políticas, científicas y alienígenas. Las evidencias de validez provenientes del contenido de la prueba fueron adecuadas de acuerdo al coeficiente V de Aiken. Las personas con mayores niveles de pensamiento conspirativo tuvieron también respuestas consistentes en una escala de pensamiento conspirativo de un ítem, confiaban menos en la efectividad de prácticascientíficas (y más en prácticas pseudocientíficas) y exhibieron menores niveles de reflexión cognitiva, evidenciando validez proveniente de las relaciones con otras variables. En conclusión, la GCBS es una medida adecuada del pensamiento conspirativo en español.
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